Hi all, Chris Wells (UW-Madison) and I are coediting a special issue of the journal /Political Communication /focusing on disinformation. The deadline is Oct 1, 2018. The link is http://tiny.cc/polcom-disinfo and the full call is below. Thought there'd be some interest from some of you who I know are working on these issues. Best, /DEEN ************** *Beyond fake news: The politics of disinformation* Special Issue of /Political Communication/ Editors: Deen Freelon & Chris Wells Discussions of “fake news” rose to prominence quickly in academic and journalistic circles following the 2016 US presidential election. Scholars were quick to note the analytical deficiencies of this term, which encompasses a wide range of low-quality and potentially harmful news-like content (Wardle, 2017). The special issue we propose will focus on one such subtype, /disinformation/, whose political implications have become particularly pressing after the election. Although much disinformation is false, this is not its defining characteristic: rather, disinformation intentionally seeks to bring about a desired result using whatever messages are most effective, which can include truth, falsehoods, distortions, and inflammatory opinions. It is a type of propaganda in which the true source is usually kept hidden and the goal is often “to engender public cynicism, uncertainty, apathy, distrust, and paranoia” (Jackson, 2017, n.p.). It should not be confused with /mis/information, wherein sources believe the content to be true. While disinformation has been a standard military tactic for millennia (Weedon, Nuland, & Stamos, 2017), it has become especially relevant in global politics for several reasons. First, the decades-long, worldwide decline in news trust and democratic institutions in general has made publics more open to messages from disingenuous yet ideologically-friendly sources. Second, the maturation of social media as political media has given such sources a highly effective platform to spread their messages cheaply and quickly. President Donald Trump’s embrace of disinformation outlets on Twitter (not to mention his frequent use of the term “fake news”) demonstrates that elites are as susceptible as ordinary citizens. Third, until very recently, social media companies did not take disinformation seriously, which allowed it to thrive with impunity. Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg initially discounted the importance of “fake news” before later affirming it, and the company stated that it failed to identify political ads surreptitiously purchased by the Russian government and targeted at US citizens (Leonnig, Hamburger, & Helderman, 2017). For its part, Twitter for years allowed accounts operated by Kremlin-funded disinformation agents to impersonate legitimate American political actors (O’Brien, 2017). While communication researchers have developed a focus on misinformation in recent years (see e.g. Bode & Vraga, 2015; Nyhan, 2010; Weeks, 2015), the study of disinformation within our field is in its infancy (for a pioneering study, see Marwick & Lewis, 2017). But the developments outlined above suggest the topic deserves much more scholarly attention in contexts around the globe, especially from the field of communication. The circulation of claims intended to sow discord and subvert democratic participation is alarming to the extent that their purveyors may succeed. What is more, the potential effects of disinformation may radiate far beyond those directly exposed to it. The possibility that any unknown participant in a media environment may be a disinformation agent may itself be weaponized: for example, both the left and right have alleged that the other side has used “paid protesters” or “crisis actors” in various contexts, such as the recent high school shooting in Florida. Ultimately, we should study disinformation because it undermines the fundamental assumptions of authentic identity and motivation that make productive political communication possible. And it is likely that disinformation will remain a core component of our political communication system for the foreseeable future. Thus, political communication researchers are especially well-positioned to analyze and explain the political dimensions of disinformation, as researchers in other fields often neglect to address these matters. We seek papers that explore disinformation as a political phenomenon in accordance with the preceding, whether digital or not. Quantitative, qualitative, conceptual, and methodological submissions are all welcome, but all should make a substantial contribution to theory. Possible topics include (but are not limited to): * Disinformation and information automation (e.g., disinformation-spreading bots) * Disinformation in comparative perspective * Disinformation in the hybrid media system and attention economy * Effects and consequences of disinformation * Historical perspectives on disinformation * Individual differences in susceptibility to disinformation * Theorizing disinformation * Typologizing disinformation: Understanding differences between state-sponsored, corporate, domestic, and transnational disinformation All submissions should run between 6000 and 8000 words and follow /Political Communication/’s style guidelines. We will review and publish on the following schedule: * March 2018: Call opens * *October 1, 2018*: Initial submission deadline * November 2018: Reviews returned * 2019: Revision deadline, final decision notifications, and publication References Bode, L., & Vraga, E. K. (2015). In Related News, That Was Wrong: The Correction of Misinformation Through Related Stories Functionality in Social Media. /Journal of Communication/, /65/(4), 619–638. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12166 Jackson, D. (2017, October 17). Issue Brief: Distinguishing Disinformation from Propaganda, Misinformation, and “Fake News” – NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY. Retrieved January 20, 2018, from https://www.ned.org/issue-brief-distinguishing-disinformation-from-propagand... Leonnig, C. D., Hamburger, T., & Helderman, R. S. (2017, September 6). Russian firm tied to pro-Kremlin propaganda advertised on Facebook during election. /Washington Post/. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/facebook-says-it-sold-political-ads-... Marwick, A., & Lewis, R. (2017). /Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online/ (pp. 1–104). Data and Society Research Institute. Retrieved from https://datasociety.net/output/media-manipulation-and-disinfo-online/ Nyhan, B. (2010). Why the “Death Panel” Myth Wouldn’t Die: Misinformation in the Health Care Reform Debate. /The Forum/, /8/(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/1540-8884.1354 O’Brien, L. (2017, November 1). Twitter Ignored This Russia-Controlled Account During The Election. Team Trump Did Not. /Huffington Post/. Retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/twitter-ignored-this-russia-controlled-... Wardle, C. (2017, February 16). Fake news. It’s complicated. Retrieved March 15, 2018, from https://medium.com/1st-draft/fake-news-its-complicated-d0f773766c79 Weedon, J., Nuland, W., & Stamos, A. (2017). /Information Operations and Facebook/ (pp. 1–13). Facebook. Retrieved from https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/facebook-and-information-op... Weeks, B. E. (2015). Emotions, Partisanship, and Misperceptions: How Anger and Anxiety Moderate the Effect of Partisan Bias on Susceptibility to Political Misinformation. /Journal of Communication/, /65/(4), 699–719. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12164 -- Deen Freelon, Ph.D. Associate Professor School of Media and Journalism, UNC-Chapel Hill http://dfreelon.org | @dfreelon <https://twitter.com/dfreelon> | https://github.com/dfreelon