Re: [Air-l] ethnography and ethics
Ok this is just random. Ethical debates always seem somewhat unsatisfactory - perhaps because if any positions are incommeasureable those are ethical positions. Everything always comes back to a value statement which is contestable, and not in anyway testable or refutable. There seems no way out of an ethical debate into something which can be agreed upon. As hume argues somewhere, there is no necessary transition from an is statement to an ought statement. That value statements cannot always be clearly separated from fact statements makes things more, not less, complex or undecideable. Even if we succeed in showing an ethical possition is incoherent then it does not prove it wrong. Incoherence might be an ethical virtue after all (I've heard it argued by some religious people). Perhaps we should try and live with the incoherence etc. My suspicion is that given the world is vague and slipping, then any attempt to be be strict about morals leads people to contradict those morals. Ie when George Bush declares life in the womb is sacred and has unborn children bombed to bits... Even if the ethical position comes from God then the problem is not resolved. Should we actually follow something simply because it is commanded, or because not doing so will ultimately result in discomfort? Even if we decide on human 'goods' then there is nothing absolutely compelling about arguments which appeal to them. Thus for instance we could appeal to Eero to announce his doing research to his subjects in many ways, but he could not be forced by the arguments into accepting them. I give arguments i find persuasive below, while admitting they are not really persuasive to everyone. thus I could appeal to 'fact': For many people the internet *is* ambiguous as to whether it is private or public, (so is much non-internet space for that matter). Saying that one part is really public and another is really private may be possible on occasions but most things are not clearly marked, and cannot be marked. There are many different kinds of public, which for many will not include the public of research. Privacy and public are social constructs and vague and often contradictory. This is simply a 'fact' as far as i'm concerned, and i'm a bit surprised that some people don't percieve it - which opens up other questions i guess. I could appeal to 'self interest': you are much less likely to get sued, your work is likely to be more acceptable to colleagues, or your work will be allowed by your university ethics committee. I could appeal to a 'love of truth': When research is announced, you are then able to immerse yourself in the world, feel everything, *and* ask the kinds of questions you would not be able to ask other than as a researcher. Likewise the more people are inclined to trust you (and have tested that trust over a long period), the better will be the information they give you, the more they are able to criticise your work the better it will be, the deeper your understanding will be. I could appeal to 'empathy': You are less likely to hurt people. I could appeal to 'benefit to society': But what is considered to be of benefit to society is an ethical position in itself, and hardly persuasive *by* itself. Even if the ideas espoused do not produce the results claimed for them (as with 'free enterprise'), then that is not a proof that those are ideas are not ethical. Perhaps struggling hard against fate is an ethical position. To repeat: there is no particular reason why these rhetorical arguments should be persuasive to anyone - i'm not sure why they are persuasive to me. Are all ethical arguments rhetorical? (nothing bad is implied about rhetoric here) Others could, and have, said that sometimes we have to do research into what we consider objectionable behaviour, and that by announcing our position we will cause the people we want to observe to be quiet. Thus our ethics is not 'practical' and must be bent. The same happens when studying an elite. As suggested above any sufficiently coherent ethics will be faced with contradiction. Mind you, I have known people to do ethnography with very violent subgroups and be quite overt about their dislike.... However, if an ethics is bendable when faced with what it declares to be bad, is it an ethics? I guess that too is an ethical question with no resolution that i can see. Merely saying one position is ethical and another is not, avoids any kind of encounter with otherness. And otherness is more overt in ethics than almost anywhere else. But saying its worthwhile encountering or engaging with othernesses might also be an ethical position. To say that this position (or something else called ethical relativsim) is uncomfortable and does not make it easy to decide what is good or bad, is not a refutation of it, however much such an argument might help retain people's comfort levels. Think of extreme cold, that is not refuted by its discomfort. If one thinks that not being able to make blanket moral statments is to be unethical, then we are back to where we started, with an unresolvable moral question, and the hint of later inconsistencies. however Eero's argument that good people will be good and thus we don't need directives would lead to the same conclusion about laws, and laws are often useful as I think people would agree. So are customs - without them you cannot build much of a person :) However that does not mean we can choose customs souly by ethics as the customs make the kind of ethics that will appeal to us. Similarly if people find violation of privacy objectionable in one situation, that is not necessarilly an argument that that privacy should be violated in another situation. Ultimately the ethics that allow you to do research are similar to those ethics that allow you to survive in any sub-group. There may be no abstract non ethical 'rationality' behind it - other than force :) Researchers have the problem that they may have to deal with several incompatible ethical or legal systems, which makes life harder. That AOIR approves something will not necessarily make it ethical to the group you are studying. But again, the fact that something is uncomfortable is not a refutation of its existence or validity. This is a 'social fact', but yes you can try and change what is acceptable ethics - no you won't always succeed.... That people always argue over ethics is also a social fact as well. I don't see easy answers here. jon -- UTS CRICOS Provider Code: 00099F DISCLAIMER: This email message and any accompanying attachments may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, do not read, use, disseminate, distribute or copy this message or attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete this message. Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender, except where the sender expressly, and with authority, states them to be the views the University of Technology Sydney. Before opening any attachments, please check them for viruses and defects.
This is an insightful post, Jon. I'd like to take up his call to appeal to empirical grounds rather than ethics. I see an assumption in some of the discussion that engaging in covert ethnography gets a researcher better data than overt ethnography. That seems to serve as a justification for why hiding one's identity is desirable/necessary. Someone (maybe, Nancy? There have been so many good posts, I don't quite remember who) mentioned that hiding one's agenda with a group of people being observed does not necessarily get better insight and information. I'm wondering if anyone has concrete evidence, either empirical studies or their own personal experiences, to support or reject this assumption? Best wishes, ~JSG
-----Original Message----- From: air-l-admin@aoir.org [mailto:air-l-admin@aoir.org] On Behalf Of Jonathan Marshall Sent: Friday, May 14, 2004 12:35 AM To: air-l@aoir.org Subject: Re: [Air-l] ethnography and ethics
Ok this is just random.
<snip>
Even if we decide on human 'goods' then there is nothing absolutely compelling about arguments which appeal to them. Thus for instance we could appeal to Eero to announce his doing research to his subjects in many ways, but he could not be forced by the arguments into accepting them. I give arguments i find persuasive below, while admitting they are not really persuasive to everyone.
thus I could appeal to 'fact':
For many people the internet *is* ambiguous as to whether it is private or public, (so is much non-internet space for that matter). Saying that one part is really public and another is really private may be possible on occasions but most things are not clearly marked, and cannot be marked. There are many different kinds of public, which for many will not include the public of research. Privacy and public are social constructs and vague and often contradictory. This is simply a 'fact' as far as i'm concerned, and i'm a bit surprised that some people don't percieve it - which opens up other questions i guess.
I could appeal to 'self interest':
you are much less likely to get sued, your work is likely to be more acceptable to colleagues, or your work will be allowed by your university ethics committee.
I could appeal to a 'love of truth':
When research is announced, you are then able to immerse yourself in the world, feel everything, *and* ask the kinds of questions you would not be able to ask other than as a researcher. Likewise the more people are inclined to trust you (and have tested that trust over a long period), the better will be the information they give you, the more they are able to criticise your work the better it will be, the deeper your understanding will be.
<snip>
Some random reply to Jonathan's thoughts: At 05:34 14/05/2004, Jonathan Marshall wrote:
thus I could appeal to 'fact':
For many people the internet *is* ambiguous as to whether it is private or public, (so is much non-internet space for that matter). Saying that one part is really public and another is really private may be possible on occasions but most things are not clearly marked, and cannot be marked. There are many different kinds of public, which for many will not include the public of research. Privacy and public are social constructs and vague and often contradictory. This is simply a 'fact' as far as i'm concerned, and i'm a bit surprised that some people don't percieve it - which opens up other questions i guess.
Sorry, but your "simple fact" is about the *perception* of Internet users, the point others made here is about the actual institutional arrangements. These are AFAIS it: Public: Usenet, (most of the) WWW, Unmoderated Listserv, gopher Private: email, non-anonymous ftp Ambiguous: Moderated Listeserv, IRC These are pretty straightforward categorizations, as anyone with an Internet access can access the data in the "public" category of the Internet. If you are unaware of the public nature of these domains, then, special cases aside (minors, etc.), that's bad luck for you, in case you published something you'd rather would not want to be associated with. Of course, "privacy and public are social constructs." What else should they be? However, that does not mean that their meaning is infinitely malleable. Almost any court in the world would consider *publishing* on the web *not* as a private act. If some people really do not understand that publishing on the Internet does give you a potentially enormous audience, they still cannot be relieved of their *responsibilities* of making their work available to almost anyone with an Internet access.
I could appeal to 'self interest':
you are much less likely to get sued, your work is likely to be more acceptable to colleagues, or your work will be allowed by your university ethics committee.
I hope that most colleagues still apply different criteria, when evaluating my research. If they think that "overt" research yields *in all circumstances* the best data, then I would challenge them to back up their claim with some evidence that contradicts that the large social-psychological literature that warns against experimenter effects and the like. Nobody says that "covered" research is in all circumstances better than "overt" research. But I would like to leave the judgement, which of the two strategies is advisable in *public* settings, to methodological rather than overly restrictive ethical considerations.
I could appeal to a 'love of truth':
When research is announced, you are then able to immerse yourself in the world, feel everything, *and* ask the kinds of questions you would not be able to ask other than as a researcher. Likewise the more people are inclined to trust you (and have tested that trust over a long period), the better will be the information they give you, the more they are able to criticise your work the better it will be, the deeper your understanding will be.
Nobody on this listserv has argued that interviews are off-limits and that any research should be covert. There are good reasons to conduct "overt" research and interviews. Rather, some argued that *as a rule* you should "reveal" your researching activities. I believe this is part of the in my view *problematic* tendency to empathize with the people one researches, a "passionate participation" (Lincoln 2002: 337), which leads to the assumption that "hiding the inquirer's intent is destructive of the aim of uncovering and improving constructions." (Guba & Lincoln 1994: 115). At least in sociology, economics, and political science, I believe, that such proceeding is counterproductive, as (unconditional) empathy also risks the absorption of hegemony into one's theories. In fact, I would argue, that in order to perform a "critical" analysis of everyday life, it is imperative to "break" with everyday life categories (Bourdieu et al. [1973] 1991), which in most cases runs counter the experiences of those researched.
I could appeal to 'empathy':
You are less likely to hurt people.
I trust, you mean hurting people in a non-physical and non-criminal way. Well, I'd say that hurting people emotionally is a hazard of life. Some people might indeed feel hurt by overt research, since they feel exploited as "research objects", while covered research published in an obscure sociology journal (and for the general public even AJS and ASR are obscure journals) might leave them unfazed. But that is besides the point. I have already mentioned, that good social research may "hurt" some people and make others happy.
I could appeal to 'benefit to society':
But what is considered to be of benefit to society is an ethical position in itself, and hardly persuasive *by* itself. Even if the ideas espoused do not produce the results claimed for them (as with 'free enterprise'), then that is not a proof that those are ideas are not ethical. Perhaps struggling hard against fate is an ethical position.
I agree with you here more or less, but I cannot see any connection to the question, if covert research is ethically justified or not. I would reckon in most cases it is, but in many cases, it might still not be the best methodological strategy to conduct one's research. Thomas REFERENCES Bourdieu, Pierre, Jean-Claude Chamboredon, and Jean-Claude Passeron. [1973] 1991. The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries. Berlin, FR Germany: De Gruyter. Guba, Egon. G and Yvonna S Lincoln. 1994. Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. In Handbook of qualitative research, edited by Denzin, Norman K and Yvonna S Lincoln. (Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications). Lincoln, Yvonna S. 2002. Emerging Criteria for Quality in Qualitative and Interpretative Research. In The qualitative inquiry reader, edited by Denzin, Norman K and Yvonna S Lincoln. (Thousand Oaks, CA. : Sage Publications).
participants (3)
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Jennifer Stromer-Galley -
Jonathan Marshall -
Thomas Koenig