jhuns@vt.edu:
the sole problem, from my analysis of the wide variety of aup available from around the world, is that each governs part, but not all of the network after a certain point of plurality. because of this, even though we can speak of an nsfnet aup, it may have been possible even that time to use nsfnet without being necessarily bound by that policy because of interconnections between networks
I think maybe this collapses two different things: (1) When the NSFNET was the One True Backbone -- and governed "all of the network" -- networks could not interconnect to it and legitimately pass commercial traffic. Some commercial traffic was passed of course but no network provider wished to connect to NSFNET as a business model. This preserved a non-commercial character but stifled growth, and is why the NSFNET AUP was important in functional (organizational/institutional) terms although naturally yuo could find many individual traffic streams which didn't respect said AUP on a usage basis. Some network providers saw a commercial opportunity in Internet though and created CIX. CIX danced around NSFNET so that NSFNET no longer governed "all of the network", 1991. Then NSFNET declared that it was no longer responsible for the whole backbone, only one of them, 1992, and got out of the way entirely, 1994. So, between 1991 and 1994 the Internet progressively became a set of interconnected networks abiding by common standards instead of a hierarchical system. By serving as the initial technical interface for non-NSFNET-AUP inteconnection, CIX was the turning point in the Internet's passage from a narrowly-used research network to a widely-used commercial network. (2) Once the NSFNET replaced itself with 4 Network Access Points (NAPs), alongside CIX, and hence consecrated the Internet's many-interconnected-networks architecture, indeed the only relevant traditional AUPs became the Acceptable Use Policies that the majority of networks impose upon their users (the "wide variety of aup available from around the world" which you have analysed). But note also a third element which maybe brings us back to where this discussion started: (3) There continues as you know to be another, more diffuse AUP-like device that governs the Internet -- Internet standards. Collectively, the Internet's corpus of RFCs (Requests for Comments) and, specifically, the BCPs (Best Current Practice documents) which award some of them special status, constitute today's version of the NSFNET AUP (rfc-editor.org). Those who do not obey the RFCs open themselves to losing interoperability. Like any policy document however enforcement of the RFCs/BCPs -- copyright still held, I think, by ISOC (isoc.org) -- is diffuse and somewhat inconsistent. Especially so on the Internet where said enforcement is collaborative not centralised. Hence non-compliance means, again, likelihood of less interoperability (outcomes of provider-by-provider decisions), not black-or-white on-net or off-net status. Social sanctions not legal sanctions comprising governance whose institutional and informal materialisations are a quite valid research subject, as socio-legal scholars might chime in. my C$0.02, Bram
But note also a third element which maybe brings us back to where this discussion started:
(3) There continues as you know to be another, more diffuse AUP-like device that governs the Internet -- Internet standards. Collectively, the Internet's corpus of RFCs (Requests for Comments) and, specifically, the BCPs (Best Current Practice documents) which award some of them special status, constitute today's version of the NSFNET AUP (rfc-editor.org). Those who do not obey the RFCs open themselves to losing interoperability.
Yes, i agree to a certain extent. However, as we currently sit on ipv4 ftmp, reverse engineering however illegal in the U.S., is still somewhat easily accomplished for internet apps depending on your technical resources. While standards are significant for much of the interoperability, i see this as significantly threatened in a wide variety of ways.
Like any policy document however enforcement of the RFCs/BCPs -- copyright still held, I think, by ISOC (isoc.org) -- is diffuse and somewhat inconsistent.
you are very correct, and as ISOC is in the middle of a political upheaval right now, I'm considering getting together a isoc documentation project together to capture some of what has happened and why it is so very important, but I've not talked to the ptb at isoc about it yet. However, having been part of several of the occurences there in the recent past, and given my growing critical stance toward them, I'm not sure I'm the best person to lead this project, but it should be at least started. ietf and the rfc process is fairly easy to document, that is not a problem, but since the copyrights are held by isoc, and isoc is currently changing its governing structure to be heavily industry oriented, there may be problems in the near future. IMHO, isoc is paralleling the problems most people have with ICANN right now, and that is not good.
Especially so on the Internet where said enforcement is collaborative not centralised. Hence non-compliance means, again, likelihood of less interoperability (outcomes of provider-by-provider decisions), not black-or-white on-net or off-net status.
I call this the IM(instant messaging) paradigm right now.
Social sanctions not legal sanctions comprising governance whose institutional and informal materialisations are a quite valid research subject, as socio-legal scholars might chime in.
yes, we'll see how this plays out, it is definitely in the arena that needs research, I'm into ISOC/IETF/IAB in situ right now, though the list died after my last post.... so we'll see.
if others are interested, I'd love to get together on this sometime for a f2f brainstorming or something maybe at 3.0 or elsewhere. jeremy hunsinger jhuns@vt.edu on the ibook www.cddc.vt.edu www.cddc.vt.edu/jeremy www.dromocracy.com
participants (2)
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Bram Dov Abramson -
jeremy hunsinger