Hi all, Radhika wrote in response to Peter T. PT >> If there are universal ethics we can prove these on the Internet.
RG> whose ethics will be universalised do you suppose? and what kinds of
intolerances might that validate/legitimize?
Exactly the right questions - thank you, Radhika! And I would gently reply: I think we can propose an ethics that begins in part with the universal value implicit in the suggestion here that "universal" claims have all too often in the past served as excuses for colonialism, imperialism, and other forms of oppression and violence - namely, that tolerance for Others (those whose identities, views, and practices may differ radically from our own) and affiliated presumptions of human equality should be endorsed exactly as the bases for criticizing claims to universality that instead led to colonialism, etc. I would add: this tolerance is not unlimited. Rather, I think it's quite possible to endorse tolerance as a universal value - but not thereby be committed to tolerating, say, fascist regimes and violent repression of women and minorities. On the contrary, by proposing that rights to integrity, autonomy, cultural identity, and so forth are, at the very least, strong candidates for universal rights (and their attendant obligations) - such universal rights and values provide precisely the grounds for criticizing earlier "universal" claims affiliated with colonialism, etc., as well as for criticizing contemporary expressions of violence and intolerance of "the Other". My (admittedly characteristic mid-Western [North American]) optimism on this point is fueled in part precisely by the success of the AoIR ethical guidelines. Admittedly, while our ethics working committee included members from Malaysia and Thailand, the background for the guidelines were largely derived from "Western" countries such as the U.S., the E.U., Scandinavia, and the U.K. Nonetheless, the guidelines are reported to us as being used in apparently effective ways in an increasing range of cultural venues. Moreover, my more recent work (with the help, I must hasten to add, of many, many colleagues in these domains) on Information Ethics and Internet Research Ethics in countries such as China, Japan, Thailand, and Korea also offer grounds for optimism. For example, two recent examples of Internet research in Japan demonstrate more or less perfect consonance with the AoIR guidelines recommendations regarding informed consent, protection of confidentiality, anonymity, and personal data, etc. Indeed, emerging conceptions of privacy and data privacy protection law in these countries - while clearly retaining distinctive cultural shape in their conception and application - are nonetheless recognizable cousins of "Western" conceptions and laws. This suggests that even across the considerable cultural differences, say, between the U.S. and Germany, on the one hand, and China, Japan, Thailand, Korea, and Hong Kong, on the other - there may be agreement on basic (universal?) values such as privacy, while at the same time recognizing the validity of clearly different implementations and understandings of what data privacy protection means in practice in each country, as shaped by very different cultural backgrounds, histories, and traditions. This is not to say that all cultural differences and resulting conflicts can be deftly side-stepped through such pluralism (I have examples of these as well). But I do think that universal values may be discerned - in part, through an on-going dialogue that works to critically assess any such putative values, precisely with a critical eye towards how any such values might in fact work in oppressive rather than liberating ways. Indeed, I think we make more progress towards some sort of shared, humane value system_s_ and ethics through such dialogues, rather than giving up the effort, however much previous failures and disasters might tempt us to do so. I _dont_ take Radhikas point to encourage such temptation but wanted to offer these comments. Hope this helps in some way. All the best in the meantime, Charles Ess Distinguished Research Professor, Interdisciplinary Studies Drury University 900 N. Benton Ave. Springfield, Missouri 65802 USA voice: (1) 417-873-7230 fax: (1) 417-873-7435 homepage: www.drury.edu/ess/ess.html "The world can provide for everyone's needs - but not for everyone's greed." - Gandhi
I knew you'd take that on;-) r
Hi all,
Radhika wrote in response to Peter T.
PT >> If there are universal ethics we can prove these on the Internet.
RG> whose ethics will be universalised do you suppose? and what kinds of
intolerances might that validate/legitimize?
Exactly the right questions - thank you, Radhika! And I would gently reply: I think we can propose an ethics that begins in part with the universal value implicit in the suggestion here that "universal" claims have all too often in the past served as excuses for colonialism, imperialism, and other forms of oppression and violence - namely, that tolerance for Others (those whose identities, views, and practices may differ radically from our own) and affiliated presumptions of human equality should be endorsed exactly as the bases for criticizing claims to universality that instead led to colonialism, etc. I would add: this tolerance is not unlimited. Rather, I think it's quite possible to endorse tolerance as a universal value - but not thereby be committed to tolerating, say, fascist regimes and violent repression of women and minorities. On the contrary, by proposing that rights to integrity, autonomy, cultural identity, and so forth are, at the very least, strong candidates for universal rights (and their attendant obligations) - such universal rights and values provide precisely the grounds for criticizing earlier "universal" claims affiliated with colonialism, etc., as well as for criticizing contemporary expressions of violence and intolerance of "the Other". My (admittedly characteristic mid-Western [North American]) optimism on this point is fueled in part precisely by the success of the AoIR ethical guidelines. Admittedly, while our ethics working committee included members from Malaysia and Thailand, the background for the guidelines were largely derived from "Western" countries such as the U.S., the E.U., Scandinavia, and the U.K. Nonetheless, the guidelines are reported to us as being used in apparently effective ways in an increasing range of cultural venues. Moreover, my more recent work (with the help, I must hasten to add, of many, many colleagues in these domains) on Information Ethics and Internet Research Ethics in countries such as China, Japan, Thailand, and Korea also offer grounds for optimism. For example, two recent examples of Internet research in Japan demonstrate more or less perfect consonance with the AoIR guidelines recommendations regarding informed consent, protection of confidentiality, anonymity, and personal data, etc. Indeed, emerging conceptions of privacy and data privacy protection law in these countries - while clearly retaining distinctive cultural shape in their conception and application - are nonetheless recognizable cousins of "Western" conceptions and laws. This suggests that even across the considerable cultural differences, say, between the U.S. and Germany, on the one hand, and China, Japan, Thailand, Korea, and Hong Kong, on the other - there may be agreement on basic (universal?) values such as privacy, while at the same time recognizing the validity of clearly different implementations and understandings of what data privacy protection means in practice in each country, as shaped by very different cultural backgrounds, histories, and traditions.
This is not to say that all cultural differences and resulting conflicts can be deftly side-stepped through such pluralism (I have examples of these as well). But I do think that universal values may be discerned - in part, through an on-going dialogue that works to critically assess any such putative values, precisely with a critical eye towards how any such values might in fact work in oppressive rather than liberating ways. Indeed, I think we make more progress towards some sort of shared, humane value system_s_ and ethics through such dialogues, rather than giving up the effort, however much previous failures and disasters might tempt us to do so. I _dont_ take Radhikas point to encourage such temptation but wanted to offer these comments. Hope this helps in some way. All the best in the meantime,
Charles Ess Distinguished Research Professor, Interdisciplinary Studies Drury University 900 N. Benton Ave. Springfield, Missouri 65802 USA voice: (1) 417-873-7230 fax: (1) 417-873-7435 homepage: www.drury.edu/ess/ess.html
"The world can provide for everyone's needs - but not for everyone's greed." - Gandhi _______________________________________________ The Air-l-aoir.org@listserv.aoir.org mailing list is provided by the Association of Internet Researchers http://aoir.org Subscribe, change options or unsubscribe at: http://listserv.aoir.org/listinfo.cgi/air-l-aoir.org
Join the Association of Internet Researchers: http://www.aoir.org/
-- Radhika Gajjala Associate Professor School of Communication Studies Bowling Green State University Bowling Green, OH 43403 http://personal.bgsu.edu/~radhik
My reply got horribly long, so I blogged it instead: http://bastubis.blogspot.com/ Monday Paula Radhika Gajjala wrote:
I knew you'd take that on;-)
r
Hi all,
Radhika wrote in response to Peter T.
PT >> If there are universal ethics we can prove these on the Internet.
RG> whose ethics will be universalised do you suppose? and what kinds of
intolerances might that validate/legitimize?
Exactly the right questions - thank you, Radhika! And I would gently reply: I think we can propose an ethics that begins in part with the universal value implicit in the suggestion here that "universal" claims have all too often in the past served as excuses for colonialism, imperialism, and other forms of oppression and violence - namely, that tolerance for Others (those whose identities, views, and practices may differ radically from our own) and affiliated presumptions of human equality should be endorsed exactly as the bases for criticizing claims to universality that instead led to colonialism, etc. I would add: this tolerance is not unlimited. Rather, I think it's quite possible to endorse tolerance as a universal value - but not thereby be committed to tolerating, say, fascist regimes and violent repression of women and minorities. On the contrary, by proposing that rights to integrity, autonomy, cultural identity, and so forth are, at the very least, strong candidates for universal rights (and their attendant obligations) - such universal rights and values provide precisely the grounds for criticizing earlier "universal" claims affiliated with colonialism, etc., as well as for criticizing contemporary expressions of violence and intolerance of "the Other". My (admittedly characteristic mid-Western [North American]) optimism on this point is fueled in part precisely by the success of the AoIR ethical guidelines. Admittedly, while our ethics working committee included members from Malaysia and Thailand, the background for the guidelines were largely derived from "Western" countries such as the U.S., the E.U., Scandinavia, and the U.K. Nonetheless, the guidelines are reported to us as being used in apparently effective ways in an increasing range of cultural venues. Moreover, my more recent work (with the help, I must hasten to add, of many, many colleagues in these domains) on Information Ethics and Internet Research Ethics in countries such as China, Japan, Thailand, and Korea also offer grounds for optimism. For example, two recent examples of Internet research in Japan demonstrate more or less perfect consonance with the AoIR guidelines recommendations regarding informed consent, protection of confidentiality, anonymity, and personal data, etc. Indeed, emerging conceptions of privacy and data privacy protection law in these countries - while clearly retaining distinctive cultural “shape” in their conception and application - are nonetheless recognizable cousins of "Western" conceptions and laws. This suggests that even across the considerable cultural differences, say, between the U.S. and Germany, on the one hand, and China, Japan, Thailand, Korea, and Hong Kong, on the other - there may be agreement on basic (universal?) values such as privacy, while at the same time recognizing the validity of clearly different implementations and understandings of what data privacy protection means in practice in each country, as shaped by very different cultural backgrounds, histories, and traditions.
This is not to say that all cultural differences and resulting conflicts can be deftly side-stepped through such pluralism (I have examples of these as well). But I do think that universal values may be discerned - in part, through an on-going dialogue that works to critically assess any such putative values, precisely with a critical eye towards how any such values might in fact work in oppressive rather than liberating ways. Indeed, I think we make more progress towards some sort of shared, humane value system_s_ and ethics through such dialogues, rather than giving up the effort, however much previous failures and disasters might tempt us to do so. I _don’t_ take Radhika’s point to encourage such temptation – but wanted to offer these comments. Hope this helps in some way. All the best in the meantime,
Charles Ess Distinguished Research Professor, Interdisciplinary Studies Drury University 900 N. Benton Ave. Springfield, Missouri 65802 USA voice: (1) 417-873-7230 fax: (1) 417-873-7435 homepage: www.drury.edu/ess/ess.html
"The world can provide for everyone's needs - but not for everyone's greed." - Gandhi _______________________________________________ The Air-l-aoir.org@listserv.aoir.org mailing list is provided by the Association of Internet Researchers http://aoir.org Subscribe, change options or unsubscribe at: http://listserv.aoir.org/listinfo.cgi/air-l-aoir.org
Join the Association of Internet Researchers: http://www.aoir.org/
A few more comments (some repetition from my previous post): At 15:02 28/03/2005, Paula wrote:
My reply got horribly long, so I blogged it instead: http://bastubis.blogspot.com/ Monday
Paula:
The objection is not only that traditional, liberal constructs of universal ethics have represented the interests of those who control capital resources
And so did particularist ethics. Paula:
For example, nomads are not gonna get too excited about habeas corpus -- they have no prisons!
Nomads live today in nation states (Maghreb countries and Mongolia spring to my mind, also Gypsies/Travellers in Europe), which maintain prisons: They definitely benefit from effective habeas corpus rights, which have frequently been denied to them. Paula:
Liberals see it a certain way, <http://www.islam-online.net/IOL-English/dowalia/debate-15-10/debat2.asp>Moslems might think about separation of the public and private spheres quite differently. Both might value privacy and even the neocons would agree that privacy is a right, but would Moslems or neocons agree that consenting homosexuality in private was OK?
I don't like this juxtapositions between "liberals" (a political persuasion) and Muslims (sometimes defined by creed, but often also an ethnicity) at all. Bassam Tibi, a political scietist, who contributes frequently to debates about Islam in Germany, for instance, considers himself both a Muslim and a liberal. Paula:
Would contemporary liberals agree that the private sphere is constituted in the inalienable authority of the male head of the family as irreducible primary unit of capitalism (as classical Liberals saw it)?
John Stuart Mill, *the* archetypical classical liberal dedicated an entire eassay to the subjugation of women, which he did not approve: http://www.ecn.bris.ac.uk/het/mill/women.htm Paula:
(liberalism being a Anglo-American construct)
Please. Most prominent liberals came from Europe, most importantly from the UK. Paula:
Representative democracy is not only conceptually flawed but,
I cannot find anything in your article that is specific for "representative democracy." Paula:
historically speaking, is currently engaged not only in the illegal occupation of Iraq but also in torture,
Where is your evidence for this observation? Paula:
illegal detention without trial,
Obviously a flaw in the (US/UK) systems, but hardly a result of universalist values. Paula:
dangerous levels of pollution,
How does this debatable statement relate to universalism and/or representative democracy? Paula:
One would hope that new forms of more direct and participatory democracy will emerge and reform of global institutions may open out negotiation of fairer trade and more equitable development.
Why do you think that direct democracy would be more equitable than representative democracy? Switzerland offers more participatory elements in its polity than most other countries. Does that maen it is a fairer country than, say, Sweden? My favorite article for republicans, who cherish "participatory democracy" so much: http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/civsoc.htm Thomas -- thomas koenig, ph.d. department of social sciences, loughborough university http://www.lboro.ac.uk/research/mmethods/staff/thomas/index.html
Replies interleaved: Thomas Koenig wrote:
A few more comments (some repetition from my previous post): At 15:02 28/03/2005, Paula wrote:
My reply got horribly long, so I blogged it instead: http://bastubis.blogspot.com/ Monday
Paula:
The objection is not only that traditional, liberal constructs of universal ethics have represented the interests of those who control capital resources
And so did particularist ethics.
Dunno what particularist ethics are and not sure what they have to do with it?
Paula:
For example, nomads are not gonna get too excited about habeas corpus -- they have no prisons!
Nomads live today in nation states (Maghreb countries and Mongolia spring to my mind, also Gypsies/Travellers in Europe), which maintain prisons: They definitely benefit from effective habeas corpus rights, which have frequently been denied to them.
Of course, if resettled in environments where prisons are maintained. My point, obviously, was that in the absence of prisons, habeas corpus would be meaningless -- i.e. that constructs of "rights" are historically specific.
Paula:
Liberals see it a certain way, <http://www.islam-online.net/IOL-English/dowalia/debate-15-10/debat2.asp>Moslems might think about separation of the public and private spheres quite differently. Both might value privacy and even the neocons would agree that privacy is a right, but would Moslems or neocons agree that consenting homosexuality in private was OK?
I don't like this juxtapositions between "liberals" (a political persuasion) and Muslims (sometimes defined by creed, but often also an ethnicity) at all. Bassam Tibi, a political scietist, who contributes frequently to debates about Islam in Germany, for instance, considers himself both a Muslim and a liberal.
Yep, and there are also gay Moslems, defined by creed and/or culture of origin. Sorry, I should have said "Islamist" rather than "Moslem" in this context. i.e. people who would see Islam as both a creed and a political philosophy -- a duty placed on Moslems by God to ensure that the political environment facilitates the practice of Islam.
Paula:
Would contemporary liberals agree that the private sphere is constituted in the inalienable authority of the male head of the family as irreducible primary unit of capitalism (as classical Liberals saw it)?
John Stuart Mill, *the* archetypical classical liberal dedicated an entire eassay to the subjugation of women, which he did not approve:
I'm familiar with Mill and with his feminist critics. However, classical liberal constructs of the family can be argued to facilitate sexism even if ostensibly opposed to it. E.g. Elshtain http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/titles/497.html
Paula:
(liberalism being a Anglo-American construct)
Please. Most prominent liberals came from Europe, most importantly from the UK.
Yes, I said *Anglo*-American -- "Anglo" is to England as "Sino" is to China when I was still in a British philosophy department, Classical liberalism is English in origin, the Anglo-American philosophical tradition is shared primarily by British and US institutions. On the Continent, folk are prone, well, to Continental philosophy -- the phenomenological tradition -- my background (tho I'm a Brit).
Paula:
Representative democracy is not only conceptually flawed but,
I cannot find anything in your article that is specific for "representative democracy."
The West is specific for representative democracy. Or so they say . . .
Paula:
historically speaking, is currently engaged not only in the illegal occupation of Iraq but also in torture,
Where is your evidence for this observation?
Iraq occupation is illegal in the opinion of the British Foreign Office -- it seems pretty clear that the FO bowed to goverment pressure to make a false statement prior to the invations: http://www.occupationwatch.org/article.php?id=5374 Torture: Guantanamo documentation collated by Amnesty International: http://web.amnesty.org/pages/guantanamobay-library-eng Torture in the US penal system: http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webamrcountries/UNITED+STATES+OF+AMERI... Torture in UK penal system, particularly in Northern Ireland and with regard to ethnic minorities: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR450231998?open&of=ENG-384
Paula:
illegal detention without trial,
Obviously a flaw in the (US/UK) systems, but hardly a result of universalist values.
I am not blaming universalist values for these infractions. I am questioning the function of "universal values" in preventing such infractions -- these are taking place in what is supposed to be democratic regimes which enshrine values such as habeas corpus and freedom from torture. Fat lot of good those values are doing at the moment? My point is that these methods are used by regimes to maintain economic injustice. It's not only that universalising values may be an imposition on the realities of cultural diversity but also that regimes such as the USA and the UK are ignoring both the "universal" liberal values on which they're based and international treaties intended to universalise basic human rights.
Paula:
dangerous levels of pollution,
How does this debatable statement relate to universalism and/or representative democracy?
Again, values are doing a fat lot of good here.
Paula:
One would hope that new forms of more direct and participatory democracy will emerge and reform of global institutions may open out negotiation of fairer trade and more equitable development.
Why do you think that direct democracy would be more equitable than representative democracy? Switzerland offers more participatory elements in its polity than most other countries. Does that maen it is a fairer country than, say, Sweden?
I said "new forms" as yet unpredictable. Swiss direct democracy is effectively a veto by referendum. I should have said "participatory". And I was pretty clear that I don't necessarily see this as a panacea. "The people" can be full of crap -- as Switzerland's current problems with institutional racism demonstrate.
My favorite article for republicans, who cherish "participatory democracy" so much:
Liike I said, I'm not convinced by participatory democracy but what's your solution? By the way, don't teach me to suck eggs!
Thomas
Paula, Selon Paula <pmg@gmx.co.uk>:
Replies interleaved:
Thomas Koenig wrote:
Paula:
The objection is not only that traditional, liberal constructs of universal ethics have represented the interests of those who control capital resources
And so did particularist ethics.
Dunno what particularist ethics are and not sure what they have to do with it?
With particularist ethics I simply mean non-universalist ethics. In the other post I gave racism as an (admittedly biased) example for a particularist value system (if we can construct it for the time being as a coherent system), but you can constuct of course much more benign particularist systems. I was just making the point that it's hardly a defining property of liberal universalist values that they were (ab)used to legitimize (unjust) inequality. Any dominant value system is prone to be used or abused by the dominant classes, so I would hesitate to jump from "has been used for the interest of dominant classes" to "is unusable for universal ethics." [Nomads and habeas corpus rights]
Of course, if resettled in environments where prisons are maintained. My point, obviously, was that in the absence of prisons, habeas corpus would be meaningless -- i.e. that constructs of "rights" are historically specific.
Of course, any rights are historically specific, as they are socially constructed. Who would deny that? But we are living in a historical period, which is dominated by nation states. In that period nomads do/would benefit from habeas corpus rights, even if these were not indegineuos to nomads (why not?). Unless you think that (any) nomadic rights or organizational system would be superior, why would it matter that nomadic societies *did* not know habeas corpus? [...]
Sorry, I should have said "Islamist" rather than "Moslem" in this context. i.e. people who would see Islam as both a creed and a political philosophy -- a duty placed on Moslems by God to ensure that the political environment facilitates the practice of Islam.
I am unfamiliar with most varieties Islamism, but I am sure that there are Islamic groups, whose goals are inimical to liberal universalism. In the part of the world where I live it is mostly Christian groups, which effectively challenge liberal values. I would say that certainly the state should not endorse some Christian conceptions of homosexuality, even if these are endemic to "Christian culture." A core (universliast) liberal value is individual freedom, which should not be unduly curtailed by any form of association.
I'm familiar with Mill and with his feminist critics. However, classical liberal constructs of the family can be argued to facilitate sexism even if ostensibly opposed to it. E.g. Elshtain http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/titles/497.html
Haven't read the link yet, but I am sure that there are good arguments that Mill's philosophy had a patriachal bias. After all, he lived at a time, when patrachy was hegemonic (in Gramsci's sense), so how would you expect him *not* to be chauvinist to some extent? However, at the time, he was hardly at the ideological forefront of the "keep patriachy" movement. Therefore, I think it makes sense to look at what exactly was patriachal in his thinking, rather than to debunk his ideas and those of his later followers altogether as anti/non-feminist.
Yes, I said *Anglo*-American -- "Anglo" is to England as "Sino" is to China when I was still in a British philosophy department, Classical liberalism is English in origin, the Anglo-American philosophical tradition is shared primarily by British and US institutions. On the Continent, folk are prone, well, to Continental philosophy -- the phenomenological tradition -- my background (tho I'm a Brit).
Sorry, my mistake, I interpreted Anglo-American as American of a certain heritage. I obviously should have known better. Guess, the grass is always greener on the other side, since I am European from the Continent and obviously prefer Anglo-American traditions.
I cannot find anything in your article that is specific for "representative democracy."
The West is specific for representative democracy. Or so they say . . .
Maybe, but what's then representative of participatory/republican democracy? Attac? Robespierre? A neigborhood watch association? [Torture in US/UK] http://www.occupationwatch.org/article.php?id=5374 http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webamrcountries/UNITED+STATES+OF+AMERI... http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR450231998?open&of=ENG-384 OK, I agree with that (I thought you were referring to the widely-publicized incidents of torture, which were not endorsed by the US/UK, but nevertheless happened under their jurisdiction). However, I still cannot see how liberal universalist values would endorse torture? [...]
I am not blaming universalist values for these infractions. I am questioning the function of "universal values" in preventing such infractions -- these are taking place in what is supposed to be democratic regimes which enshrine values such as habeas corpus and freedom from torture.
But now you are critizing the (failing) implementation of these values rather than the values themselves. I would not contest that criticism.
It's not only that universalising values may be an imposition on the realities of cultural diversity but also that regimes such as the USA and the UK are ignoring both the "universal" liberal values on which they're based and international treaties intended to universalise basic human rights.
I agree on the last half of the sentence, but would like to point out that state-endorsed values are always "imposed" on parts of the population. I am happy to go along with that democratic principle, as long as some minimal citizenship rights are ensured for everyone. It's of course up for discussion, what are exactly these rights. [...]
I said "new forms" as yet unpredictable. Swiss direct democracy is effectively a veto by referendum. I should have said "participatory". And I was pretty clear that I don't necessarily see this as a panacea. "The people" can be full of crap -- as Switzerland's current problems with institutional racism demonstrate.
Oh, but I took it (also) as participatory democracy, which I cannot see to be a safeguard against the practices that you (rightfully in my view) debunk. Quite to the contrary, I think that "participatory democracy" might lead to even more unjust situations, as empirically those who participate tend to be drawn from particular social strata ("new middle classes" to use a buzzword).
Liike I said, I'm not convinced by participatory democracy but what's your solution?
Universal(ist/-izing) liberal democracy sounds to me the most reasonable solution.
By the way, don't teach me to suck eggs!
Sorry, I did not mean to be patronizing, but intended to be polemical (as I (mis?)took your post as polemics). Thomas -- thomas koenig, ph.d. department of social sciences, loughborough university, u.k. http://www.lboro.ac.uk/research/mmethods/staff/thomas/index.html
Hi, I would like to offer a little comment from a "hardcore universalist": At 01:55 28/03/2005, Charles Ess wrote:
I think we can propose an ethics that begins in part with the universal value implicit in the suggestion here that "universal" claims have all too often in the past served as excuses for colonialism, imperialism, and other forms of oppression and violence - namely, that tolerance for Others (those whose identities, views, and practices may differ radically from our own) and affiliated presumptions of human equality should be endorsed exactly as the bases for criticizing claims to universality that instead led to colonialism, etc.
True, (false) claims to universalism have repeatedly served to legitimize exclusionary politics, but there is nothing inherent in universalism, which leads to, say, colonialism. (Truly) particularist claims, such as racist ideas, also served to legitimize such politics. More importantly though, cultural relativism/pluralism is itself a decidedly *universalist* value, which originates in modernist (aka "Western") thought. To reject universalism in favor of cultural pluralism is therefore self-defeating: "The assertion that cultures are incommensurable is in fact a transcultural claim rooted in universalistic philosophical thinking." (Barry, Brian S. (2001): "Culture and Equality," Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, p. 264).
I would add: this tolerance is not unlimited. Rather, I think it's quite possible to endorse tolerance as a universal value - but not thereby be committed to tolerating, say, fascist regimes and violent repression of women and minorities.
I am sure you did not mean it that way, but let me ask for the sake of rhetorics: Does that mean that "repression of women and minorities" is OK, as long as it refrains from violence? Of course, this is a rhetorical question, but it shows that if we value individual autonomy, certain forms of repression (e.g., the exclusion of Amish children from general education) some would subsume under the heading of "cultural autonomy" might lead into conflict with core liberal/emancipatory values. [...]
My (admittedly characteristic mid-Western [North American]) optimism on this point is fueled in part precisely by the success of the AoIR ethical guidelines.
You might be sampling on the dependent variable here. I already voiced several times my dissent with parts of these guidelines, and I was not the only one on that matter, either (see, e.g., earlier thread "Google is watching" http://listserver.dreamhost.com/pipermail/air-l-aoir.org/2004-May/thread.htm...). People outside the acadamy, or even outside social sciences, will rarely have commented on the AoIR guidelines, so it seems difficult for me to see, how you would establish near-universal agreement with these guidelines.
Admittedly, while our ethics working committee included members from Malaysia and Thailand, the background for the guidelines were largely derived from "Western" countries such as the U.S., the E.U., Scandinavia, and the U.K.
A small interjection, as I live in the U.K.: It *is* still part of the EU (as is most of Scandinavia) -- sorry could not resist. [...]
Indeed, emerging conceptions of privacy and data privacy protection law in these countries - while clearly retaining distinctive cultural "shape" in their conception and application - are nonetheless recognizable cousins of "Western" conceptions and laws. This suggests that even across the considerable cultural differences, say, between the U.S. and Germany, on the one hand, and China, Japan, Thailand, Korea, and Hong Kong, on the other - there may be agreement on basic (universal?) values such as privacy, [...]
I am unsure what kind of value "privacy" is. It can only be a value with respect to certain domains (say, "family affairs"), but not a universal value as such. When it comes to the question, which *are* the domains, for which privacy should be granted: These cannot a priori or empirically be derived, at least according to Habermas' (1992, Faktiziataet und Geltung, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, p. 380) ethics, which I find quite reasonable on this point.
But I do think that universal values may be discerned - in part, through an on-going dialogue that works to critically assess any such putative values, precisely with a critical eye towards how any such values might in fact work in oppressive rather than liberating ways. Indeed, I think we make more progress towards some sort of shared, humane value system_s_ and ethics through such dialogues, rather than giving up the effort, however much previous failures and disasters might tempt us to do so.
I almost agree with this, but I think that the plural-s on systems cannot be sustained, because, evidently there are value systems (you mentioned fascism, which after all does offer a value system, even if reprehensible) that run against universal values that from a liberal point of view are not up for discussion. Thomas -- thomas koenig, ph.d. department of social sciences, loughborough university http://www.lboro.ac.uk/research/mmethods/staff/thomas/index.html
participants (4)
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Charles Ess -
Paula -
Radhika Gajjala -
Thomas Koenig