September 2001 - Air-L - lists.aoir.org

some notes about 09.11 and the Internet
by aurelija dagilyte 20 Sep '01

20 Sep '01

Hello, I wanted to share some impressions about the well-known events and some tendencies I've noticed in Russian and other post-soviet countries Internet. As an anthropologist I was interested what do the ordinary people of these countries really think about what happened, while their governments speak nice phrases supporting the US and the war against the terrorism. The result was interesting - while all TV channels, radio stations were speaking how that was terrible and bad, on the Internet I've found very wide scale of opinions and emotions. It seems so, that in post-soviet countries is a difference between the Internet and other media. I had an impression that TV channels and radio programs presented more or less censored view and on the Internet almost all expressed opposite position to the official. These tendencies had even more increased when US started to talk about the war in the Afghanistan. I think a lot of people still remember the Russian war in that country and it's useless. Another interesting thing is the fact that politic discussions still dominates in the chat rooms and web pages which usually are not interested in the politics. I'm not sure if the opinions presented on the net had some influence on the other media, but after some time more skeptic view started to appear on the Russian TV too. I'm very curios what will be next. Regards, Aurelija Dagilyte

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Re: [Air-l] Music and the internet
by neice＠kw.igs.net 20 Sep '01

20 Sep '01

Hi Jens, A useful discussion of music and digital technology is found in Chapter 2 (Music: Intellectual Property's Canary in the Digital Coal Mine) of the citation noted below. This book most assuredly does not use ANT, but it still offers a solid analysis. National Research Council (2000), The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Information Age, Washington DC: National Academy Press. Please write me off-line about your work as I have done some work on file sharing that may be relevant. Cheers, david neice ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ David C. Neice digital-literacy.com :-) Website at http://www.kw.igs.net/~neice/ Address: 47 Combermere, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 5B2 Tel: 519-885-2951 Fax: 519-885-5263 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Decentralized terror networks ....
by Ken Friedman 20 Sep '01

20 Sep '01

Dear Colleagues, A recent post wonders, At 03:20 PM 9/17/2001 -0400, you wrote: >Has anyone else on this list been struck by the parallel between the >current portrait of de-centralized terrorist networks emerging in the >media coverage and the organizational logic of distributed computer >networks? [...] Here follows a report on a related theme from Stratfor, a global intelligence analyst. I pass it on with permission. Stratfor publishes a free daily summary that is available at their Web site. Ken Friedman Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2001 16:37:08 -0500 From: <alert(a)stratfor.com> To: redalert(a)stratfor.com Subject: No Easy Battle ____________________________________________________S T R A T F O RTHE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY ____________________________________________________13 September 2001 COMPLIMENTARY INTELLIGENCE REPORT - FULL TEXT ____________________________________________________**NOTE**This is a complimentary full-text intelligence report, normally reserved for members only. For full-text reports every day and access to the full range of global intelligence, become a member today! http://www.stratfor.com/COMPANY/info.htm ____________________________________________________No Easy Battle2000 GMT, 010914SummaryIn the wake of this week's terrorist attacks in the United States, the U.S. government is trying to decide how it can defeat its new style of enemy. The key to victory is finding the enemy's center of gravity, or what enables it to operate, and destroying it. But what has worked for the U.S. military in the past may not be enough this time around.AnalysisThe foundation of any successful military operation is defining and attacking the enemy's center of gravity: the capacity that enables it to operate. A war effort that does not successfully define the enemy's center of gravity, or lacks the ability to decisively incapacitate it, is doomed to failure. The center of gravity can be relatively easy to define, as was the Iraqi command and control system, or relatively difficult to define, as was Vietnam's discovery of America's unwillingness to indefinitely absorb casualties. In either case, identifying the adversary's center of gravity is the key to victory.In the wake of this week's terrorist attacks in the United States, this question is now being discussed in the highest reaches of the American government. The issue, from a military standpoint, is not one of moral responsibility or legal culpability. Rather, it is what will be required to render the enemy incapable of functioning as an effective force. Put differently, what is the most efficient means of destroying the enemy's will to resist?This is an extraordinarily difficult process in this case because it is not clear who the enemy is. Two schools of thought are emerging though. One argues that the attackers are essentially agents of some foreign government that enables them to operate. Therefore, by either defeating or dissuading this government from continuing to support the attackers, they will be rendered ineffective and the threat will end.Such a scenario is extremely attractive for the United States. Posing the conflict as one between nation-states plays to American strength in waging conventional war. A nation-state can be negotiated with, bombed or invaded. If a nation-state is identified as the attackers' center of gravity, then it can by some level of exertion be destroyed. There is now an inherent interest within the U.S. government to define the center of gravity as Iraq or Afghanistan or both. The United States knows how to wage such wars.The second school of thought argues that the entity we are facing is instead an amorphous, shifting collection of small groups, controlled in a dynamic and unpredictable manner and deliberately without a clear geographical locus. The components of the organization can be in Afghanistan or Boston, in Beirut or Paris. Its fundamental character is that it moves with near invisibility around the globe, forming ad hoc groups with exquisite patience and care for strikes against its enemies. This is a group, therefore, that has been deliberately constructed not to provide its enemies with a center of gravity. Its diffusion is designed to make it difficult to kill with any certainty. The founders of this group studied the history of underground movements and determined that their greatest weakness is what was thought to be their strength: tight control from the center. That central control, the key to the Leninist model, provided decisive guidance but presented enemies with a focal point that, if smashed, rendered the organization helpless. This model of underground movement accepts inefficiency -- there are long pauses between actions -- in return for both security, as penetration is difficult, and survivability, as it does not provide its enemies with a definable point against which to strike.This model is much less attractive to American military planners because it does not play to American capabilities. It is impervious to the type of warfare the United States prefers, which is what one might call wholesale warfare. It instead demands a retail sort of warfare, in which the fighting level comprises very small unit operations, the geographic scale is potentially global and the time frame is extensive and indeterminate. It is a conflict that does lend itself to intelligence technology, but it ultimately turns on patience, subtlety and secrecy, none of which are America's strong suits.It is therefore completely understandable that the United States is trying to redefine the conflict in terms of nation-states, and there is also substantial precedent for it as well. The precursor terrorist movements of the 1970s and 1980s were far from self-contained entities. All received support in various ways from Soviet and Eastern European intelligence services, as well as from North Korea, Libya, Syria and others. From training to false passports, they were highly dependent on nation-states for their operation.It is therefore reasonable to assume the case is the same with these new attackers. It would follow that if their source of operational support were destroyed, they would cease to function. A bombing campaign or invasion would then solve the problem. The issue is to determine which country is supplying the support and act.There is no doubt the entity that attacked the United States got support from state intelligence services. Some of that support might well have been officially sanctioned while some might have been provided by a political faction or sympathetic individuals. But although for the attackers state support is necessary and desirable, it is not clear that destroying involved states would disable the perpetrators.One of the principles of the attackers appears to be redundancy, not in the sense of backup systems, but in the sense that each group contains all support systems. In the same sense, it appears possible that they have constructed relationships in such a way that although they depend on state backing, they are not dependent on the support of any particular state.An interesting development arising in the aftermath is the multitude of states accused of providing support to the attackers: Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Algeria and Syria, among others, have all been suggested. All of them could have been involved in some way or another, with the result being dozens of nations providing intentional or unintentional support. The attackers even appear to have drawn support from the United States itself, as some of the suspected hijackers reportedly received flight training from U.S. schools. The attackers have organized themselves to be parasitic. They are able to attach themselves to virtually any country that has a large enough Arab or Islamic community for them to disappear into or at least go unnoticed within. Drawing on funds acquired from one or many sources, they are able to extract resources wherever they are and continue operating.If such is the case, then even if Iraq or Afghanistan gave assistance, they are still not necessarily the attackers' center of gravity. Destroying the government or military might of these countries may be morally just or even required, but it will not render the enemy incapable of continuing operations against the United States. It is therefore not clear that a conventional war with countries that deliberately aided the culprits will achieve military victory. The ability of the attackers to draw sustenance from a wide array of willing and unwilling hosts may render them impervious to the defeat of a supporting country. The military must systematically attack an organization that tries very hard not to have a systematic structure that can be attacked. In order for this war to succeed, the key capability will not be primarily military force but highly refined, real-time intelligence about the behavior of a small number of individuals. But as the events of the last few days have shown, this is not a strength of the American intelligence community. And that is the ultimate dilemma for policymakers. If the kind of war we can wage well won't do the job, and we lack the confidence in our expertise to wage the kind of war we need to conduct, then what is to be done? The easy answer -- to fight the battle we fight best -- may not be the right answer, or it may be only part of the solution. ____________________________________________________<<<<<<<<<<<< SEND THIS TO A FRIEND! >>>>>>>>>>>>>Did you like this analysis? Then forward it to a friend!Got this from a friend? Get your own by becoming a member! http://www.stratfor.com/COMPANY/info.htm <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ____________________________________________________CONTACTS AND CUSTOMER SERVICES: STRATFOR 700 Lavaca, Suite 405 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-744-4300 Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ Email: info(a)stratfor.comADVERTISE For information on advertising in the GIU or any section of the STRATFOR website, please email us at advertising(a)stratfor.com ====================================================(c) 2001 Strategic Forecasting LLC. All rights reserved.

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CFP:Computers and Communication
by John Monberg 20 Sep '01

20 Sep '01

CALL FOR PAPERS SPECIAL ISSUE: COMPUTERS and COMMUNICATION The Southern Communication Journal announces a special issue exploring the relationship between communication and computers. With the rise of the information society, computers mediate an increasingly large range of relationships, transforming audiences, social networks, and our sense of self and place. This issue seeks to explore how computers transform communication and develop theories required to register these changes. Work in all areas of communication is welcome. Topics addressed might include: Evolution of the interactive media industry The changing role of the university in the information age Political rhetoric on the Web Internet access to health information Consequences of Internet technology use for interpersonal relationships Completed manuscripts, following the "To Contributors" notice published in SCJ Summer 2001 or later, for the special issue should be submitted to: John Monberg Guest Editor, Southern Communication Journal Department of Communication 310 Strickler Hall University of Louisville Louisville, KY 40292 Telephone: 502-852-7867 Electronic mail: jmonberg(a)louisville.edu The cover letter should clearly state that the submission is for consideration in the Computers and Communication special issue. All submissions must be postmarked on or before August 1, 2002.

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Re: [Air-l] Internet traffic on Sept. 11
by Jill Walker 20 Sep '01

20 Sep '01

Just came across http://www.internettrafficreport.com/ which seems to have statistics exactly like this, updated every 15 minutes. Quite interesting really. Packet loss on Sept 11 was huge. Unfortunately the most detailed stats are in graphs for the last 24 hours, 7 days or 30 days and the 30 day graph doesn't show Sept 11 very clearly - but this is a stats site to keep in mind for the future, anyway. Jill From: "Ryan J. Burns" <rburns1(a)tulane.edu> To: <Air-l(a)aoir.org> Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2001 10:14:23 -0500 Subject: [Air-l] Internet traffic on Sept. 11 Reply-To: air-l(a)aoir.org Has anyone seen statistics on Internet traffic on Sept. 11 and 12? If so, where? I noticed that the major news websites were really "slow" on Sept. 11. I also heard the CEO of Earthlink on NPR talk about huge spikes in traffic to his member sites. He also mentioned that e-mail use was down, and the use of synchronous chat was up. I'm teaching a CMC class and would love to talk about it in class.

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Re: Air-l digest, Vol 1 #111 - 2 msgs
by Janet Morahan-Martin 19 Sep '01

19 Sep '01

Bryant College is accepting applications for a postion as an assistant professor of psychology in health psychology/biopsychology. A full description is below. Feel free to forward this to anyone who may be interested. Sorry for cross-postings. Janet Morahan-Martin Janet PSYCHOLOGY ASSISTANT PROFESSOR POSITION Health Psychology/ Biopsychology: Tenure-track appointment to begin August 2002. Qualifications include: Ph.D. in psychology (by July 1, 2002) with specialization in appropriate areas, demonstration of research record and potential for continued research program and commitment to undergraduate teaching with evidence of potential for teaching excellence. The psychology program and Bryant College are in an exciting period of growth and will provide the successful candidates unique opportunities for professional development. Responsibilities include: participation in the development of a new psychology major; undergraduate teaching, including curriculum development; maintaining an active research program; and engaging in college service. Research specializations within health and/or biopsychology are open, but preference will be given to applicants with an applied focus. Teaching responsibilities include: general psychology, research methods, health psychology, and a course that emphasizes biopsychology are needed. Applications must be received by October 16, 2001 to be assured consideration. Applicants must submit a letter of application, statements of research and teaching interests, curriculum vitae, reprints and three letters of reference to Human Resources Box-APA, Bryant College, 1150 Douglas Pike, Smithfield, RI 02917. In the address include the appropriate attention line: Psychology Search. For any information, please contact rdeluga(a)bryant.edu. Bryant College, a student-centered College, enrolls approximately 3000 students at both the graduate and undergraduate level, and is in Smithfield, RI, located 15 minutes from Providence and one hour from Boston. Bryant College is AA/EOE. Qualified women, minorities, veterans, and individuals with disabilities are strongly encouraged to apply. Bryant College offers a competitive salary and benefits package. ******************************************************* Janet Morahan-Martin, Ph.D. Phone: +401-232-6268 Professor of Psychology Fax: +401-232-6319 Bryant College e-mail: jmorahan(a)bryant.edu 1150 Douglas Pike Smithfield, RI 02917-1284 USA *******************************************************

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Re: [Air-l] networks
by Prof. Andrejevic 19 Sep '01

19 Sep '01

Has anyone else on this list been struck by the parallel between the current portrait of de-centralized terrorist networks emerging in the media coverage and the organizational logic of distributed computer networks? Certainly both forms of networking emerged with a similar goal in mind: a resiliance to the forms of centralized large-scale attacks characteristic of warfare in the first half of the 20th century. Redundancy and de-centralization are defensive structures whose effectiveness is demonstrated by the fact (reported yesterday, I think) that despite the destruction of something like 10 percent of Manhattan's office space, suprisingly little data was lost. In the face of this kind of distributed networking, the type of military response envisioned by Bush/Cheney et alia seems disturbingly out of joint. Just as we wouldn't imagine that we could take down a network by hitting a node, so too does the goal of "taking out" Osama bin Laden seem more symbolic than effective (to the effect that it works to proliferate cells of resistance, it might even be read as counter-productive). I'm wondering if there's some way to use the commonly accepted discourse on computer networking to shed some light on the current debate over the appropriate U.S. response to the recent acts of terrorism.

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Re: [Air-l] networks (re-send)
by Ted Friedman 19 Sep '01

19 Sep '01

What struck me most at Manuel Castell's talk at AOIR last year was his emphasis on examctly the opposite of this "distributed networking" happening with respect to business locations. Cities like SF and NYC, and regions like Silicon Valley, were growing denser and denser, just as the technologies they were developing seemed to promise to obliterate distance in time and space. As I remember, Castells concluded that there was some fundamental level of "human capital" that was necessary for the face-to-face engagement that's still at the core of even postmodern business deals. So, the more spread out the world gets, the more centalized these "nodes" must be, to serve the periphery. At the time, it seemed ironic, almost nostalgaic; now, it does seem doomed. I imagine corporate headquarters becoming the same kinds of paramilitary "gated communities" described in Mike Davis's City of Quartz and Neal Stephenson's Snowcrash. Of course, Castells also hyped the wonders of Cisco's business model, just before their stock tanked. Any other thoughts on how the attacks may change the geography of America? -- Ted Friedman, Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Department of Communication Georgia State University (404) 463-9522 tedf(a)gsu.edu; ted(a)tedfriedman.com http://www.tedfriedman.com

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Re: Air-l networks
by Niels Ole Finnemann 19 Sep '01

19 Sep '01

At 18:01 +0200 on 19/09/01, air-l-request(a)aoir.org wrote: I would like to come in with a comment from far away: In air-l 117 Aldon Hayes wrote: »In neural networks, it is the network itself, and its connections that store the information and not the individual nodes«. and he continues making analogies to the human mind and the internet as well as to the supposed network of some terrorist groups. This sort of analogy is widespread, but are such analogies also useful? I believe them to be strongly misleading metaphors mainly for two reasons: First, because we really don't know <italic>how</italic> neural networks (supposed to performe the brain functions) relate to the processes of the human mind, ie: mental content, feelings, thoughts and production of, say, scientific theory. We only know that there seems to be some sort of relationship. Second, on the internet it seems to me that the content is always stored at individual nodes and never on the net. This is also the case even if the content is distributed among different nodes. Even the code allowing the fractional parts need to be stored on a node itself. On the internet information is always stored in a physical place which can be adressed. I would also doubt the assumption that the internet is of a kind that allows it to be »an organization having knowledge that the individuals don't have«. Humans may have knowledge and a group of humans may have knowledge that the indiciduals don't have. But the internet??? It reminds me of Wittgenstein saying that even if lions had a language we wouldn't be able to understand it. Maybe a useful network theory should be elaborated to include such important differences? Niels Ole Finnemann ******************************************************************************** Niels Ole Finnemann http://www.hum.au.dk/ckulturf/pages/php/finnemann.html Lektor, dr. phil. Leder af Center for Internetforskning, http://imv.au.dk/cfi/ Institut for Informations- og Medievidenskab Aarhus Universitet Niels Juelsgade 84 Mail: finnemann(a)imv.au.dk 8200 Århus N Tlf: Dir: 89 42 19 34 - Univ: 89 42 11 11

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a bunch of nominations
by Nancy Baym 19 Sep '01

19 Sep '01

Hello all, I want to nominate a number of people to run for open seats, secretary, treasurer, or for that matter any other position for which they would accept a nomination. First, Steve Jones has my whole-hearted support for a second term as president. Second, I am hoping to continue as vice president (and thanks Michel and David). Third, this is a probably incomplete listing of people that I know have made contributions to air-l and to air, whom I hope will consider running: - Charles Ess (chair of ethics working group) - John Logie (conference coordinator this year) - Laura Gurak (also working on this year's conference) - Ira Nayman (working on future conferences) - Monica Murero (working on future conferences) - Gil Rodman - Thom Swiss - Mia Consalvo (the previous 3 did lots of work on the first conference as well as other things) - David Silver - Reinhold Grether (those two have compiled magnificent databases of cyberstuff and I believe can do much to further this association) Other people who have chimed in with opinions or otherwise lent perspectives I think would be good to have on board: - Gitte Stald - Klaus Bruhn Jensen - Jonathan Sterne - Michel Menou - Nils Zurowski - Ulla Bunz Now I know that self-nominating can be embarrassing, but if I missed your name and you think you have something to offer, PLEASE nominate yourself, via email if you don't want to do it publically! If I have omitted your name, please don't take it as evidence that I don't think you'd be a good person to have on (the) board! Nancy

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